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1I.    Introduction
European Welfare States are characterized by dual labour markets. Low-skilled
workers are typically unionized, while high-skilled workers often negotiate on their
wages individually, and, thus, face more competitive wage formation. Historically,
labour unions have been able to push for relatively high wages of low-skilled workers,
at the cost of a higher unemployment in Continental Europe than in the United States
(see e.g. Freeman and Schettkat (2001)). During the late 20th century and this decade,
globalization has put the European welfare model under increasing pressure. Wage
differences across countries constitute a central explanation for the increasing dominant
business practice of international outsourcing across a wide range of industries (see e.g.
Sinn (2007) for an overview and Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy
of outsourcing).1
When outsourcing and domestic labour are substitutes, the demand for domestic
homogenous labour is decreasing and its wage elasticity is increasing in the share of
outsourcing (see e.g. Senses (2006) for empirical evidence). This limits the mark-up
trade unions can set above the opportunity cost of labour. Outsourcing can take two
alternative forms. Firms may write long-term contracts that fix the amount of
outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage, i.e. strategic outsourcing, or
alternatively firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing
activity simultaneously with domestic labour demand after the domestic wage is set by
the trade union. In the case of homogenous domestic labour the impacts of labour tax
policy reforms have been analyzed in Koskela and Schöb (2008) both in the case of
strategic and flexible outsourcing.
We analyze the effects of international outsourcing and wage taxation on dual
domestic labour markets by assuming that the low-skilled workers are unionized, while
1      Moreover, Amiti and Wei (2005) as well as Rishi and Saxena (2004) emphasize the big difference
in labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both
manufacturing and services to countries with low labour costs.
2the wages of high-skilled workers are determined competitively.2 In Koskela and
Poutvaara (2008) we have assumed that outsourcing in this kind of dual domestic
labour markets is strategic, but now we study how flexible outsourcing and labour
taxation affect wage formation, employment and welfare in dual domestic labour
markets. We use a production function where outsourcing is complementary for
domestic high-skilled labour and substitutable to domestic low-skilled labour.
We show that in the presence of flexible outsourcing the own wage elasticity
and the cross wage elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend negatively on
the cost of outsourcing, and on the factor price of outsourcing and positively on the
payroll tax, and the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the high-
skilled labour demand are independent of the cost of outsourcing and the payroll tax.
We also find that the outsourcing elasticities are constant with respect to the low-skilled
wage, the payroll tax, the productivity of outsourcing and the cost of outsourcing.
When the high-skilled wage adjusts to equalize labour demand and labour supply, the
high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage and the payroll tax. The
high-skilled wage is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters in the case of
high-skilled workers’ Cobb-Douglas utility function. Moreover, the high-skilled wage
depends on the cost of outsourcing and of the productivity of outsourced production
indirectly, through its effect on low-skilled wage. The reason for this is that high-skilled
and low-skilled labour are complements, so that low-skilled wage affects how much
low-skilled labour input firms want to employ. However, there is no direct link from
outsourcing cost and outsourcing productivity parameters to high-skilled wage.
In the presence of flexible outsourcing the lower cost of outsourcing, the lower
factor price of outsourcing and the higher productivity of outsourced production will
decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and increase the wage for the high-skilled
labour, thereby inducing higher wage dispersion. The higher low-skilled wage tax rate
will increase the wage for the low-skilled labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled
2       There are some papers that analyze the effects of outsourcing when labour is heterogeneous, like
Davidson et al. (2007) and Davidson et al. (2008). However, these papers analyze labour market
frictions that arise with search, while we focus on the role of labour unions. Importantly, the
effects of labour taxation may differ even qualitatively between models with labour unions and
with search related employment (see e.g. Pissarides (1998) concerning the analysis of this issue in
the absence of outsourcing).
3labour and the higher low-skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the wage for the
low-skilled labour and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labour. Similar
qualitative effects arise in the absence of outsourcing. With flexible outsourcing, the
higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-skilled and high-
skilled labour. In the absence of outsourcing, the higher payroll tax for the firms will
decrease the wage for the high-skilled labour, but has no effect on the wage of low-
skilled labour.
Increasing the wage tax and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to
keep the relative burden per worker constant implies a higher degree of tax progression.
This will decrease the wage rate and increase labour demand of low-skilled workers,
while it will have no effect on the labour demand of high-skilled workers.
Corresponding effects arise in the absence of outsourcing. We show that a higher
degree of tax progression for low-skilled workers will decrease the welfare of low-
skilled workers and increase the welfare of high-skilled workers. Also the profits of
firms increase.
We proceed as follows: Section II presents the time sequence of the decisions
regarding some policy issues associated with labour taxes, wage setting for domestic
low-skilled workers, labour demand for domestic high-skilled and low skilled workers,
outsourcing and wage setting for high-skilled workers. We study the segmented
domestic labour demand for heterogenous work force and outsourcing decision and
wage formation of high-skilled workers due to market equilibrium under labour
taxation in section III. Wage formation by the monopoly labour union for low-skilled
workers under a linearly progressive wage tax levied on workers and a proportional
payroll tax levied on firms is analyzed in section IV. In section V we study the impacts
of low-skilled wage progression on employment, welfare and profits. Finally, we
summarize conclusions in section VI.
II. Basic Framework
We analyze a model with heterogeneous domestic workers and international
outsourcing. The production combines labour services by high-skilled workers and low-
4skilled workers. Low-skilled labour services can be provided either by the firm’s own
workers, or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing. We assume that
the firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing activity
only after the wage is set by the trade union. The time sequence for this case is
described by Figure 1.
                stage 1              stage 2                            stage 3
time
              tax policy      low-skilled wage           high-skilled and low-skilled
  decisions       by labour union    labour demand, outsourcing decision,
                                                               high-skilled labour supply and
high-skilled wage
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
The government sets its policy at stage 1. At stage 2 conditional on policy
choices by the government, the labour union determines the wage for the low-skilled
workers by taking into account how this affects the demand for labour and outsourcing
by the firms. We assume that there are many industries, so that each labour union
represents only a small fraction of the total labor force. At stage 3, firms decide on
domestic employment and international outsourcing. The wages of the high-skilled
labour adjust to equalize labour demand and labour supply. The decisions at each stage
are analyzed by using backward induction.
III. Labour Demand, Outsourcing Decisions and High-Skilled Wage
Formation
III.1.  Labour Demand and Outsourcing
5At the last stage, the firm decides on the high-skilled labour demand H , the
low-skilled labour demand L  and outsourcing M in order to maximize the profit
function
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When deciding on its labour demand and outsourcing, each firm takes as given the
gross wage for high-skilled labour, )1(~ sww HH ?? , and the gross wage for low-skilled
labour, )1(~ sww LL ?? , where s  is the proportional payroll tax levied on the firm. In
order to obtain M  units of outsourced low-skilled labour input, we assume that firms
acquire the low-skilled labour input at the factor price Mw  and also firms have to spend
25,0)( cMMg ?  with 0)(' ?? cMMg  and 0)('' ?? cMg  to establish the capacity for
foreign outsourcing concerning the network of suppliers in the relevant low-wage
countries.
We follow Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) by assuming a general and reasonable
Cobb-Douglas-type production function with decreasing returns to scale according to
three labour inputs, i.e. ? ??? aa MLHMLHF ??? 1)(),,( , where the parameters ?  and
a  are assumed to satisfy the following assumptions : 10 ?? ?  and 10 ?? a . The
parameter 0??  captures the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input
relative to the domestic low-skilled labour input. The marginal products of high-skilled
labour, low-skilled labour and outsourcing are: aaH MLaHYF
??? ?? 111 )( ?? ? ,
aa
L MLaHYF
?? ??? ))(1(1 ?? ? , and L
aa
M FMLaHYF ????
? ???? ?? ))(1(1
respectively, where aa MLHY ??? 1)( ? . The outsourced low-skilled labour input
affects the marginal products of the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour inputs
as follows:
0)()1(112 ???? ??? aaHM MLaaHYF ???
?                                                       (2a)
? ? 0)1(1)()1( 11 ??????? ??? aMLaHYF aaLM ???? ? . (2b)
6For this production function the domestic high-skilled labour input and the outsourced
low-skilled labour input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic labour
input and the outsourced low-skilled labour input are substitutes in terms of the
marginal product effects of outsourcing. Also one can calculate from the production
function that the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour are complements, i.e.
0?HLF . Given the wages, the outsourcing cost function and the tax parameters the
first-order conditions characterizing the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labour
demands and outsourcing are
? ? 0~)()( 1111 ????? ???? HaaaaH wMLaHMLH ???? ? (3a)
? ? 0~)()1()( 11 ?????? ??? LaaaaL wMLHaMLH ???? ?                  (3b)
? ? 0)()1()( 11 ??????? ??? cMwMLHaMLH MaaaaM ????? ? .                  (3c)
These first-order conditions imply the following relationship between the high-skilled
labour ( H ) and the low-skilled labour inclusive of outsourcing ( ML ?? )
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Using (3b) and (3c) we have
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7According to (5) optimal flexible outsourcing requires that ML wsw ?? )1(?  so that
factor price of outsourcing should be smaller than the gross factor price of domestic
low-skilled labour multiplied by the relative productivity of outsourcing. Higher low-
skilled domestic wage rate, higher payroll tax and higher productivity of outsourced
labour input, lower outsourcing cost and lower factor price of outsourcing will increase
outsourcing.
Substituting the RHS of (4) into (3b) gives (see Appendix A) the low-skilled
labour demand, which can be expressed as follows
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where ? ? 0)1( 1 11 ??? ?? ???? aa aam , 1
1
1 ?
?
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?
?? aLL  and 01
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?
?? aLH , which are the
own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour in the
absence of outsourcing .3  These are higher with weaker decreasing returns to scale. In
the absence of outsourcing the payroll tax elasticity of the low-skilled labour is
1
1
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?
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?
?
L
sLs  because of the decreasing returns to scale. According to (6),
a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the low-skilled labour demand. This
feature is consistent with empirical evidence.4 In the presence of outsourcing the wage
elasticities of the low-skilled labour,
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3      In the presence of perfect substitutability between two types of labour inputs, i.e. between L  and
M , we would have 1?? . However, qualitative results would be similar.
4       For instance Diehl (1999) has presented empirical evidence from German manufacturing
industries in support of this hypothesis. Moreover, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level
data of the Irish electronic sector to empirically conclude that international outsourcing reduces
plant-level labour demand.
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Concerning these wage elasticities we find that
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change, the own wage and cross wage elasticities of the low-skilled labour demand
increase. These are in conformity with empirical evidence.5 Differentiating (7a) with
respect to s  gives
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so that the payroll tax in the presence of outsourcing will have a positive effect on the
wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour demand. Comparative statics is qualitatively
similar in terms of fH? , but there is no wage elasticity effect of payroll tax in the
absence of outsourcing, i.e. 0
0
?
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?M
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payroll tax elasticity of the low-skilled labour,
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5        Senses (2006) has provided empirical evidence according to which a production mode with more
ttoutsourcing seems to increase the wage elasticity of labour demand. Also Slaughter (2001) and
Hasan et al. (2007) have shown that international trade has increased the wage elasticity of labour
demand.
9so that higher outsourcing raises this elasticity as well. The effect of outsourcing cost
on the wage elasticity of low-skilled labour is
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so that lower outsourcing cost will increase wage elasticity of domestic low-skilled
labour demand. Also one can show that higher outsourcing productivity will increase
the wage elasticity, i.e. 0?
?
?
?
? fL . The effect of factor price of outsourcing on the wage
elasticity of low-skilled labour is
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Of course, lower factor price of outsourcing will increase the wage elasticity of
domestic low-skilled labour demand.
Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (6) into the relationship in equation (4)
gives the following demand for the high-skilled labour
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returns to scale, but unlike in the case with the low-skilled labour, both the own wage
and cross wage labor demand elasticities, and the payroll tax elasticity for the high-
skilled labour are independent of outsourcing. The higher own wage, cross wage and
payroll tax will of course affect negatively the high-skilled labour demand.
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the domestic
labour demand as follows.
Proposition 1 In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) both the own wage and the cross wage elasticities for the low-skilled
labour demand depend negatively on the cost of outsourcing and factor
price of outsourcing, and positively on the payroll tax, and
(b) both the own wage and the cross wage elasticities for the high-skilled
labour demand are independent of the cost of outsourcing and the payroll
tax.
Proposition 1 reveals an asymmetry in how the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled
labor react to the cost of outsourcing and the level of payroll taxes. An increase in
outsourcing cost or payroll tax would increase the own wage elasticity, and the cross
wage elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand, while having no effect on the
elasticities for the high-skilled labour demand.
III.2.  Wage Formation for High-Skilled Workers
III.2.1 Optimal Labour Supply of High-Skilled Workers
11
We assume that the market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw  follows
from the equality of labour demand and the labour supply by using the case of Cobb-
Douglas (C-D) utility function, so that the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure is one. First we derive labour supply and after that the wage
formation from market equilibrium by taking the low-skilled wage Lw  as given.
We assume that the government can employ the proportional wage tax Ht  for
high-skilled worker, which is levied on the wage rate Hw  minus tax exemption He .
Thus the total tax base in this case is Hew HH )( ? , where H  is labour supply. In the
presence of positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax
rate )/1( HHH wet ?  so that the system is linearly progressive.
6 The net-of-tax wage, the
high-skilled worker receives, is HHHHH etwtw ??? )1(ˆ .
Labour supply of the high-skilled worker is determined by utility maximization.
In the case of the C-D utility function maximizing ?? ??? 1)1(),( HCHCU , 10 ?? ? ,
s.t. CHwH ?ˆ  with respect to labour supply H  gives
0)1()ˆ)(1(ˆ)1()ˆ( 11 ?????? ??? ???? ?? HHwwHHwU HHHH  so that
??sH                                                                                               (13)
Therefore under this assumption the net-of-tax wage HHHHH etwtw ??? )1(ˆ will have
no effect on labour supply when the substitution and income effects of wage rate cancel
each other. It is important to emphasize that a central finding in the empirical labour
market literature is that labour supply tends to be quite unresponsive along the intensive
margin (see for empirical evidence, e.g. Immervoll et al (2007) and Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999)). Therefore, we focus on this finding concerning the market
equilibrium of high-skilled workers.
6     For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another
elaboration, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).
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III.2.2 Market Equilibrium for High-Skilled Wage Formation
Unlike in the case of low-skilled workers we assume that the high-skilled wage
Hw  is determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the labour
demand function and the labour supply function. In the case of C-D utility function the
equality sHH ?*  gives ???? ??
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Equation (15) lies in conformity with empirics concerning the negative relationship
between high-skilled and low-skilled wages.7  The effect of payroll tax on the wage rate
of high-skilled workers is
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so that higher payroll tax will decrease the wage rate of high-skilled workers because it
decreases labour demand given the labour supply (concerning empirical evidence, see.
e.g. Daveri and Tabellini (2000), and Bingley and Lanot (2002)). According to (13) the
high-skilled wage rate does not depend on the outsourcing cost and the productivity of
outsourcing.
7       See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel
(2007), Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001), Hijzen et al (2005), Hijzen (2007), Egger and Egger
(2006), Munch and Skaksen (2005), Riley and Young (2007) and Geishecker and Görg (2008).
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We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the high-skilled
wage determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 2 In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively  on the low-skilled wage and  the
payroll tax, but is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters in
the case of high-skilled workers’ Cobb-Douglas utility function, and
(b)  the high-skilled wage is also directly independent of the cost of
outsourcing and the productivity of outsourcing, but depends indirectly on
the low-skilled wage change and the productivity of the low-skilled wage
change so that higher outsourcing cost will decrease, while higher
productivity of low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic labour
input  will increase the high-skilled wage.
In the first sight, it may appear surprising that the high-skilled wage reacts negatively to
the low-skilled wage tax, but is independent of their own wage tax. The intuition for
this relies on our assumption that the high-skilled workers have a Cobb-Douglas utility
function. With it, income and substitution effects of a tax increase on the labor supply
cancel each other out.
IV. Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union
Now we analyze the wage formation of low-skilled workers so that it takes
place in anticipation of optimal labour and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We
analyze the wage formation by the monopoly union (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg
(2004), p. 401-403 concerning the monopoly union specification), which determines the
wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house low-skilled labour
14
demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing determined simultaneously and of
market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw .
8
IV.1.  Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labour Union
We investigate the wage formation by monopoly labour union when there is
proportional payroll tax, and the linearly progressive wage tax for low-skilled workers.
The market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage Hw  follows from the equality of
labour demand and the labour supply by focusing the case of C-D utility function. The
monopoly labour union determines the wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of
optimal domestic labour demand and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We assume
that government can employ a proportional tax rate Lt , which is levied on the wage rate
Lw  minus a tax exemption e , i.e. the total tax base is
*)( LewL? . In the presence of a
positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate
)/1( LL wet ?  so that the system is linearly progressive and the net-of-tax wage is
etwtw LLLL ??? )1(ˆ .
 The objective function of the labour union is assumed to be
NbLbwNbLbetwtV LLLLLLLL ????????
** )ˆ())1(( , where Lb  is the (exogenous)
outside option available to the low-skilled workers and N is the number of labour union
members. The monopoly labour union sets wage for the low-skilled workers so as to
maximize the surplus according to
? NbLbwV LLL
wL
??? *
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)ˆ(max                                                                             (17)
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8 In Western European countries, which we like to focus, labour market institutions are close to this
(see e.g. Freeman (2008)).
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where in the presence of payroll tax ??? ??? ?
?
? )1(
1
* sww
a
maH
H
L
H
H
LH  and ??
sH , which
implies
H
H
H
H
H
LH
H sw
ma
aw LH
?
?
?
?
?? ???
???
?
??
? ?? )1()1(
1
  (see equations (12), (13) and (14)).
The first-order condition associated with (17) is
.0))1(()1( *
*
*
**
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???????
H
L
L
HHwLw
LLLLLL
L
w w
w
w
w
L
wL
L
wL
betwtwt
w
LV HL
L
         (18)
and this can be written as follows
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depends negatively on the following variables: the high-skilled wage, the low-skilled
wage, the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the
domestic low-skilled labour input, and the payroll tax and positively on the cost of
outsourcing and the factor price of outsourcing.
Equation (19) can be expressed as follows
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so that the total wage elasticity also allowing for the relationship between high-skilled
and low-skilled wages is 1)1( **
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the optimal low-skilled wage (21) even in the case of the monopoly labour union is an
implicit form in the presence of outsourcing, because the mark-up
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 depends on the low-skilled wage rate in a non-
linear way so that it cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal domestic low-skilled
wage.
17
IV.2.  Comparative Statics of Wage Formation
In order to characterize the effect of outsourcing cost on the low-skilled wage
formation we therefore apply the implicit differentiation. Differentiating the wage
formation (21) with respect to the low-skilled wage and the outsourcing cost gives
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written as follows
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so that higher (lower) outsourcing cost will increase (decrease) the wage of low-skilled
domestic workers.
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Differentiating the implicit wage formation (21) with respect to the productivity
of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic low-skilled labour
input and low-skilled wage formation gives
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which can be expressed by using
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Differentiating the implicit wage formation (21) with respect to the factor price
of outsourcing and low-skilled wage formation gives
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where like in equation (11) we have
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Therefore, lower factor price of outsourcing will have a wage moderating effect on the
domestic low-skilled wage due to the higher wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour
demand.
Moreover, and importantly, equations (23), (25) and (27) jointly with equation
(15) imply 0?
dc
dwH  and 0?
?d
dwH  and 0?
M
H
dw
dw so that both the lower cost of
outsourcing, the higher productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input and the
lower factor price of outsourcing will have positive effects on the domestic high-skilled
wage.
In terms of comparative statics of the low-skilled the wage tax, the tax
exemption and the outside option for unemployment benefit we have the following
results (see Appendix B)
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According to (28a-28c) the effects of wage tax, tax exemption and outside option on
low-skilled wage formation are qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing
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in the presence of outsourcing. Moreover, the equations (28a-c) imply jointly with
equation (15) that ,0?
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dw  so that the higher wage tax and the
higher outside option of low-skilled workers will decrease the wage for the high-skilled
labour, while the higher tax exemption of low-skilled workers will increase the wage
for the high-skilled labour.
Finally, differentiating the implicit wage formation (21) with respect to the
wage of low-skilled workers and the payroll tax gives
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which can be expressed as follows
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because the higher payroll tax will increase the wage elasticity of the low-skilled
labour, i.e.  for the reason that we have
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Therefore, the payroll tax will have a wage moderating effect concerning the low-
skilled workers’ wage, because the payroll tax will have a positive effect on the wage
elasticity. But in the absence of outsourcing it will have no effect on wage formation ,
i.e. 0
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?
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?M
f
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?  because 0?M .
The total effect of the payroll tax on the high-skilled workers’ wage is the
following (see Appendix C)
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where there is the negative direct effect and the positive indirect effect of the payroll
tax, and the total effect is negative. In the absence of outsourcing this is also negative,
because .0
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We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage formation
in the presence of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 3 In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a)  the lower cost of outsourcing, the lower factor price of outsourcing  and
the higher productivity of outsourced production will decrease the wage
for the low-skilled labour and increase the wage for the high-skilled
labour, thereby inducing higher wage dispersion, and
(b) the higher low-skilled wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labour and the higher low-
skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled
labour and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labour, and these
qualitative results are also similar but higher in the absence of
outsourcing, whereas
(c) the higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-
skilled and for the high-skilled labour. In the absence of outsourcing, the
higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the high-skilled
labour, but has no effect on the wage of low-skilled labour.
According to the first part of this proposition higher outsourcing due to lower
outsourcing cost, higher productivity of outsourcing input and lower factor price of
outsourcing is perfectly in line with the fact that the outsourced input is a substitute for
the low-skilled domestic labour and a complement for the high-skilled domestic labour.
According to the second part of this proposition the qualitative effects of wage tax and
tax exemption for the low-skilled workers are not changed by flexible outsourcing. The
third part of proposition reveals that in the absence of outsourcing the higher payroll tax
will have no effect on the wage of the low-skilled labour set by the monopoly union,
but in the presence of flexible outsourcing the monopoly union will cut the wage it sets
because the own wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour will increase. Finally, the
higher payroll tax will have a negative effect the wage for the high-skilled in the
presence of outsourcing, and also in the absence of outsourcing.
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V.   The Impacts of Low-Skilled Wage Tax Progression
V.1.   Employment Effects
Next we analyze the effect of wage tax progression on wage formation by the
low-skilled workers and labour demand. We assume that the tax reform will keep the
relative tax burden per low-skilled worker constant, which means
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The government can raise the degree of wage tax progression by increasing Lt  and e
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Concerning the low-skilled wage effect of this reform we have de
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so that a higher degree of wage tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per
low-skilled worker constant, will decrease the low skilled wage rate. In the absence of
outsourcing the qualitative effect is similar, i.e. 0
0,0
*
?
?? dMdRL
L
dt
dw  (see Appendix D).
Finally, we characterize the low-skilled employment effect by raising tax
progression keeping the relative tax burden per low-skilled worker constant to increase
Lt  and e  according to (34), so that we have the following employment effect
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so that higher degree of wage tax progression keeping the relative tax burden per low-
skilled worker constant, will increase the low skilled labour demand. These results (34)
and (35) also happen in the case of domestic dual labour markets in the presence of
strategic outsourcing (see Koskela and Poutvaara (2008)) and in the case of
homogenous domestic labour markets (see Koskela and Schöb (2008)). The qualitative
effect is similar in the absence of outsourcing.9
The total effect concerning direct and indirect effects of changes in low skilled
wage on the high-skilled labour demand is zero, i.e. **
****
* L
L
H
wLw dww
wHdwHdH
HL ?
???  can
be expressed using equation (12) as
9       This has been analyzed in the absence of outsourcing e.g. in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) and in
Koskela and Schöb (2002).
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We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage formation
and labour demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 4 In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) a higher degree of tax progression by raising the wage tax and the tax
exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative burden per
worker constant will decrease the wage rate and increase labour demand
of low-skilled workers,
(b) while it will have no effect on the labour demand of high-skilled workers
and
(c) qualitatively similar effects arise in the absence of outsourcing.
From the perspective of the labour union, an increase in tax progression changes the
tradeoff between net wage rate and employment. An increasing progression encourages
the labour union to moderate its wage demand, as the opportunity cost of a given new
wage increases in terms of additional unemployment increases.
V.2.   Welfare Effects
Now we analyze the welfare effects of low-skilled wage tax progression on the
low-skilled trade union objective, the high-skilled Cobb-Douglas utility and the firm’s
profits by still assuming that the tax reform will keep the relative tax burden per low-
skilled worker constant.
The total effect of changes in tax parameters Lt  and e  on the objective function
of low-skilled workers NbLbwNbLbetwtV LLLLLLLL ????????
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where *** )( LewV Lt L ???  and
** LtV Le ? so that 0
)( *** ??? e
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. Higher low-skilled
wage tax progression will decrease the welfare of low-skilled workers by decreasing
the wage rate. This also happens in the absence of outsourcing.
The total effect of changes in tax parameters Lt  and e  on the objective function
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tax progression will increase the welfare of high-skilled workers as a result of higher
high-skilled wage. This also happens in the absence of outsourcing.
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Finally, the total effect of changes in tax parameters Lt  and e  on the firm’s
profit is ***** * LweLt dwdedtd LL ???? ???  and to keep Rw
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(see Appendix E). Therefore, higher low-skilled wage tax progression by decreasing the
low-skilled wage will increase the firm’s profit and the qualitative result is similar in
the absence of outsourcing.
We can now summarize our findings in terms of the welfare effects of low-
skilled tax progression in dual labour markets as follows.
Proposition 5 In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) a higher degree of tax progression, resulting from raising the wage tax
and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative
28
burden per worker constant, will decrease the welfare of low-skilled
workers, and
(b) it will increase the welfare of high-skilled workers as a result of higher
high-skilled wage, and
(c) it will increase the profit of firms, and
(d) the effects of tax progression are qualitatively similar as in (a)-(c)  also in
the absence of outsourcing.
The welfare effects are driven by the changed labour union incentives, reported in
Proposition 4. Increased tax progression reduces the monopoly rent that the labour
union is able to extract, thus resulting in a lower welfare for the low-skilled union
members. At the same time, reduced low-skilled wage rate obviously increases the
profits of firms already in case the firms would not change their employment, and
further when employment changes are accounted for. The high-skilled workers gain
due to complementariness in production because higher low-skilled wage tax
progression will reduce low-skilled wage, and therefore increasing the total use of low-
skilled labour by the firms.
VI.   Conclusions
Most western European countries are characterized by dual labour markets, in
which wages of some workers are set by labour unions, while other wages are
determined competitively. In this paper we have studied how the presence of flexible
outsourcing affects such an economy when the low-skilled workers are unionized and
the high-skilled workers are employed in competitive labour markets.
We have shown that in the presence of flexible outsourcing the own wage
elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend
negatively on the cost of outsourcing, and the factor price of outsourcing and positively
on the payroll tax, and  these elasticities are independent of the cost of outsourcing and
the payroll tax for the high-skilled labour demand. By assuming that the market
equilibrium for the high-skilled wage follows from the equality of labour demand and
29
labour supply and that the high-skilled workers have a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
we find that the high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage and the
payroll tax, and it is independent of the high-skilled wage tax parameters. The high-
skilled wage depends indirectly on the low-skilled wage change and the productivity of
outsourced production so that higher outsourcing cost will decrease, while higher
productivity of low-skilled labour input relative to the domestic labour input will
increase the high-skilled wage.
In the presence of flexible outsourcing the lower cost of outsourcing, the lower
factor price of outsourcing and the higher productivity of outsourced production will
decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and increase the wage for the high-skilled
labour, thereby inducing higher wage dispersion. Moreover, the higher low-skilled
wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled labour and decrease the wage for
high-skilled labour and the higher low-skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the
wage for the low-skilled labour and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labour.
The higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-skilled and
high-skilled labour, while in the absence of outsourcing, the higher payroll tax for the
firms will decrease the wage for the high-skilled labour, but has no effect on the wage
of low-skilled labour.
In the presence of flexible outsourcing raising the wage tax and the tax exemption
for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative burden per worker constant, this higher
degree of tax progression will decrease the wage rate and increase labour demand of
low-skilled workers, while it will have no effect on the labour demand of high-skilled
workers, and this also works in the absence of outsourcing. Concerning the welfare
effects of low-skilled wage tax progression on the low-skilled trade union objective, the
high-skilled Cobb-Douglas utility and the firm’s profits, we have shown that this higher
degree of tax progression will decrease the welfare of low-skilled workers and increase
the welfare of high-skilled workers as a result of higher high-skilled wage, while it will
increase the profit of firms by decreasing the low-skilled wage.
Our framework suggests several avenues for future research. First of all, we
restricted the analysis of tax reforms to the effects of increasing tax progression for
low-skilled workers, so that their average tax rate stays the same. An alternative reform
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scenario would be to assume that the government has a given revenue requirement, and
wage tax parameters are changed so that it is still satisfied. In that case, wage taxation
would react also to employment changes. One could then also study the effects of a
reform that would change the wage tax rate and the payroll tax rate. For example, what
would be effects of increasing the low-skilled wage tax rate and lowering the payroll
tax, if the change is implemented such that the total government revenue from wage
taxes and payroll taxes does not change? Moreover, it is important to study what would
be the optimal linear labour tax structure in the presence of outsourcing?
Another important research question would be to compare the effects of flexible
outsourcing, analyzed in this paper, with strategic outsourcing in Koskela and
Poutvaara (2008). Which regime results in a higher level of outsourcing? How the wage
rates of the low-skilled and high-skilled workers differ? Which type of outsourcing
results in more low-skilled unemployment? What are the effects on the welfare of
different skill types and on the profit rates? Due to complexities involved, it appears
that such an analysis would call for a computational general equilibrium model,
allowing calculating the economic equilibrium in the two scenarios. Doing this is left
for future research.
Finally, our research calls for additional empirical work. Establishing how
common strategic and flexible outsourcing are in various industries, combined with a
theoretical analysis that would compare their economic effects, would allow to estimate
economic effects that increasing globalization can be expected to have on European
Welfare States.
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Appendix A: Optimal Low-Skilled Labour Demand
Substituting the RHS of (4) for H  into (3b) gives
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which is equivalent to
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(A3) and (5) in its turn give (6). QED.
Appendix B: Optimal Wage Setting under Progressive Wage Taxation
and Proportional Payroll Taxation
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where the own wage elasticity of labour demand is
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Differentiating (21) in terms of low-skilled wage and wage tax rate gives
L
L
L
f
L
f
L
LLf
L
L
f
Lf
L
L
f
Lf
L
dt
t
ebdwb
ww
2
*
2 )1()1(
ˆ
)1(
)1(
1
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
??
?
?
?
?
????
                           (B4)
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which gives (28a). Of course, the equations (28b) and (28c) can be derived in the
similar way. QED.
Appendix C: The total effect of the payroll tax on the high-skilled
workers’ wage
Using equations (15), (16), (30) and (31) the equation (32) can be expressed as
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QED.
Appendix D: Tax Progression and Low-Skilled Labour Demand
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Appendix E: Tax Progression and Welfare Effect of Firms
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